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Abstract 
Suspension of and limitation on fundamental rights and freedoms are 
justified violations of constitutional rights. Temporary suspension of some 
fundamental rights and freedoms can be made on the ground of a state of 
emergency. Since most constitutional rights are not absolute, they can be 
limited on basis of national security, public safety, public moral, public 
order, public health, and similar grounds. Although both suspension and 
limitation should comply with the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality, they are completely different in their conception and 
application. However, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry failed to 
distinguish suspension of constitutional rights from their limitation in CUD 
v Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres. The Council mistakenly held that 
declaration of the Prime Minister constituted limitation on right of 
assembly, demonstration and petition. Given its nature and the short period 
for which it lasted, the declaration should have appropriately held to 
constitute suspension of those rights. 
Keywords: derogation, fundamental rights and freedoms, limitation, state 
of emergency  
I. Introduction 
As justified violations of human rights, limitation and suspension have 
common features. Yet, limitation is different from suspension. Limitation 
can be imposed in normal situation for indefinite period while suspension is 
justified only in an emergency situation as temporary measures. The 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry (the Council) dealt with limitation in 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy v. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres 
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(CUD Case).1
The CUD Case has attracted attention of many human rights and 
constitutional law scholars.
 The Case was decided in the aftermath of 2005 Election on 
constitutionality of a Prime Minister’s decree banning right of assembly, 
demonstration and petition on the morrow of the 2005 National Election. A 
brief decision of the Council that it does not involve constitutional 
interpretation did not distinguish between limitation and suspension.  
2
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1. Coalition for Unity and Democracy v. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres, Fed. First 
Instance Ct., Lideta Div., File No. 54024 (Decision of 3 June 2005) (26 Ginbot 1997 E.C.) 
2. Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew, The Justiciability of Human Rights in the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 8 AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L.J. 273, 279-281 (2008); Sisay 
Alemahu, The Constitutional Protection of Economic and Social Rights in the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, J. ETH. L. 135, 144 (2008); Takele Soboka Bulto, Judicial 
Referral of Constitutional Disputes in Ethiopia: From Practice to Theory, 19 AFRICAN J. OF 
INT. AND COM. L. 99, 100 (2011) and Getachew Assefa, All about Words: Discovering the 
Intention of the Makers of the Ethiopian Constitution on the Scope and Meaning of 
Constitutional Interpretation, J. ETH. L. 139, 155(2008). According to Sisay the Court erred 
in failing to refer the case to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (the Council) without 
considering the provisions of Proclamation No. 3/1991 and without first deciding on 
whether there was lack of clarity of the Constitution; and the Council failed to decide on 
“whether there was ‘constitutional dispute’ giving rise to its jurisdiction.” According to 
Takele, the Court not only failed to specify a provision that needed interpretation but also 
failed to frame question of law while the Council went beyond its power to apply the 
Constitution to factual situation. Getachew upheld the Court’s referral to the Council as “it 
was acceptably prudent for the court to make this case a case for constitutional interpretation 
and get out of the flames.” He is of the opinion that courts should avoid political 
confrontation with the executive. He also indicates that the case involved issues of 
constitutional interpretation.  
 The scholarly comments thus far made on the 
CUD Case focus on the decision of the Court in referring the Case to the 
Council and error of the latter in assuming jurisdiction over the Case. The 
content of the Council’s holding did not succeed in attracting enough 
criticism. This comment is a modest attempt to contribute to the arguments 
by examining the content of the Council’s decision. It argues that the 
Council went completely astray and mixed derogation from fundamental 
rights and freedoms with their limitations. The comment begins with 
summary of the Case in Part I with emphasis on ruling of the Council. Part 
II provides discussion to distinguish limitation on fundamental rights from 
their suspension. Part III analyses the decision of the Council against the 
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discussion in the second part. Finally, this comment closes with concluding 
remarks. 
II. Summary of the Case 
At the end of 2005 national election, the Prime Minister of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Mr. Meles Zenawi Asres, issued a 
decree3
In its claim, the CUD stated that the decree was null and void as per 
Article 9(1) of the Constitution since banning freedom of assembly and 
demonstration violated the rights of its members guaranteed under Article 
30 of the Constitution.
 that freedom of assembly including public demonstration was 
banned in Addis Ababa and its vicinity. Following the ban on 
demonstration and assembly, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
(CUD), a political party, sued the Prime Minister in the Federal First 
Instance Court, Lideta Division.  
4
 
3. The Prime Minister’s declarations were published in Addis Zemen, a government 
owned newspaper published in Amharic. See ADDIS ZEMEN, 64th year No. 248, May 2005 (8 
Ginbot 1997 E.C.), at 1 & 6. The plaintiff presented Addis Zemen as its evidence to prove 
the issuance of the Prime Minister’s declarations. The Newspaper did not use a literal 
Amharic translation of the term “decree.” The plaintiff and the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry used memmerya (which means “directive” in Amharic). Since the term “directive” 
signifies a subsidiary legislation, which provides more detailed rules for the implementation 
of a regulation and its parent Proclamation, it is not used in this piece to avoid confusion. 
Besides, the declarations of the Prime Minister were closer to an emergency decree than a 
subsidiary legislation.   
4. FDRE CONSTITUTION, Proclamation No 1/1995, FED. NEGARIT GASETTE, 1st Year 
No.1, 1995 (here after FDRE CONSTITUTION), Art. 9(1) provides that: The Constitution is 
the supreme law of the land. Any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state 
or a public official which contravenes this Constitution shall be of no effect.  
Art. 30 provides that:   
1. Everyone has the right to assemble and to demonstrate together with 
others peaceably and unarmed, and to petition. Appropriate regulations may be 
made in the interest of public convenience relating to the location of open-air 
meetings and the route of movement of demonstrators or, for the protection of 
democratic rights, public morality and peace during such a meeting or 
demonstration. 
2. This right does not exempt from liability under laws enacted to protect the 
well-being of the youth or the honour and reputation of individuals, and laws 
prohibiting any propaganda for war and any public expression of opinions 
intended to injure human dignity. 
 It quoted the first sentence of Article 30(1) which 
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to assemble and to demonstrate 
together with others peaceably and unarmed, and to petition.” It also based 
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its claim on Article 3(1) and Article 11 of Proclamation No. 3/1991 (the 
Proclamation to Provide for Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political 
Meetings).5
 
5. The Proclamation to Provide for Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political 
Meetings, Proclamation No. 3/1991, FED. NEGARIT GAZZETA 50th Year No. 4, Addis Ababa, 
12 August 1991. 
 In its prayers, the plaintiff requested the Court to give an order 
lifting the ban on demonstration and assembly on two grounds. First, the 
plaintiff alleged that the Prime Minister had no right and power to make 
such decree; and secondly, there were no circumstances requiring the 
issuance of such decree. 
The judge, Woldemichael Meshesha, believed that the case involved 
constitutional interpretation and referred the case to the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry. He did not refer to any provisions relied upon by the 
plaintiff. His referral order did not show how the case involved issues of 
constitutional interpretation. He did not frame issue requiring constitutional 
interpretation either. 
On 14 June 2005, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry handed down 
its decision that the case did not involve constitutional interpretation. To 
reach its decision the Council framed two issues: a) whether the decree 
issued by the Prime Minister violated the Constitution, and b) whether 
there were sufficient conditions to issue the decree. In dealing with the first 
issue, the Council considered the content of Article 30(1) of the 
Constitution and held that the provision contains limitation on the exercise 
of the right.  It particularly referred to the limitation clause of the provision. 
It also relied on the preamble of Proclamation No 3/1991 and held that “the 
concerned executive organ can decide on place, direction, and time of 
public assembly and demonstration on the basis of the Proclamation.”  
The Council considered the power of the Prime Minister to issue the 
said decree. It relied on Articles 49, 72(1) and 74(13) of the Constitution. 
The Council did not find the Prime Minister’s decree prohibiting 
demonstration in Addis Ababa for one month as a violation of the 
Constitution for two reasons.  The first reason was that the Prime Minister 
is the highest executive organ vested with wide power. The other reason 
was that Addis Ababa city is accountable to the federal government under 
Article 49 of the Constitution and Article 61 of Addis Ababa City Charter. 
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Regarding the second issue, the Council held that whether there were 
sufficient conditions for prohibiting demonstration should be decided by 
the organ vested with such power in the Constitution. Anyone alleging 
absence of such condition had a burden of proving it. The Council did not 
decide on whether the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence to prove 
the absence of conditions necessitating prohibition of demonstration in 
Addis Ababa since such issue is an issue of fact rather than an issue of 
constitutional interpretation. Finally, the Council rejected the case holding 
that it did not require constitutional interpretation. 
 
III. DISTINGUISHING LIMITATION FROM DEROGATION 
A. Limitation  
 
Most fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute. They are 
limited or restricted by the same provisions that guarantee them or by a 
general provision that applies to all rights in a particular constitution. 
Limitation refers to justifiable infringement of fundamental rights and 
freedoms.6 Limitations or restrictions are exception to the general rule that 
fundamental rights and freedoms should be protected.7 Unlike derogation 
from rights during public emergencies, limitations “may remain in force 
indefinitely.”8
A provision in national constitutions or international human rights 
instruments that provides for limitation is a limitation clause (or claw-back 
clause).  A general limitation clause is contained in a separate provision 
(section or article) and applies to all rights in a constitution or in a 
particular instrument.  A provision that guarantees rights may also contain 
a specific limitation clause that applies to that specific provision only. A 
 Limitation, as the term implies, does not mean a total 
deprivation of rights whether that deprivation is temporary or permanent.  
 
6.   See generally IAIN CURRIE & JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, at 
165 (2005).  
7. NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, at 184 (2002). 
8.   Id. at 182. 
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constitution may contain specific limitation clauses together with a general 
limitation clause or it may contain specific limitation clauses alone.9
Limitations, whether they are enacted in pursuance of a general or 
specific limitation clause, should comply with certain requirements. A mere 
existence of a limitation clause does not justify limitation on human rights. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) laid down some of the requirements when it held that “[t]he 
reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate state 
interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate 




First, limitations should be “prescribed by law.” International human 
rights instruments and national constitutions usually require promulgation 
of certain law to place limitations on human rights.
  
11 The limitations must 
be “provided for by national law of general application.”12  Such laws 
should not be “arbitrary or unreasonable.”13  They should also be “clear 
and accessible to everyone.”14
Second, the purpose of limitations must be the protection of legitimate 
state interest. Protection of national security, public safety, economic well-
 
 
9.  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1996) which contains a 
general limitation clause under §36 and specific limitation clauses under other provisions; 
CONSTITUTION OF UGANDA (1995), Art. 43(1). Some international human rights instruments 
also contain general limitation clauses. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Art. 29; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted in New 
York on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976 (here after ICESCR). 
Art. 4; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on 27 June 1981 at Nairobi, 
Kenya and entered into force on 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 
ILM 58 (1982) ( here after African Charter), Art. 27(2). 
10.  Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998), 
para 69. Italics added. 
11.   See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 
on 16 December 1966, N.Y., USA, GA res. 2200A (XXI) 999 UNTS 171 (here after 
ICCPR), Arts. 12(2), 18(3), 19(3) & Art. 21; FDRE CONSTITUTION, Arts.  26(3), 27(5) & 
Art. 29(6). 
12. UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 
September 1984, E/CN.4/1985/4, para 15, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/4672bc122.html [accessed 2 July, 2012]. 
13.  Id. para 16. 
14.  Id. para 17. 
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being of a country, public health, public moral, and rights and freedoms of 
others, and prevention of crime and disorder are some examples of 
legitimate state interest. International human rights instruments and 
domestic constitutions contain these factors in their limitation clauses.15
Third, the limitation must be necessary to protect legitimate state 
interest. Necessity implies “the existence of a ‘pressing social need’, or a 
‘high degree of justification’, for the interference in questions.”
  
16 Laws 
restricting rights are necessary only when there is no other alternative that 
preserve legitimate state interest without interfering in the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Where all available alternatives interfere 
with the enjoyment of the right in question, a state must choose an 
alternative that less restricts such rights. “If a compelling governmental 
objective can be achieved in a number of ways, that which least restricts 
the right protected must be selected.”17 Limitation clauses in international 
human rights instrument and domestic clause clearly require that the 
limitations must be necessary in a democratic society.18
Finally, limitations must be proportionate with the purpose to be 
achieved.
  
19 Proportionality requires “that a balance be struck between the 
requirements of the interests sought to be protected and the essential 
elements of the recognized right.”20
The Constitution does not contain a general limitation clause that 
applies to all fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in Chapter 
 Thus, states should balance protection 
of legitimate state interest with protection of individuals’ rights. A 
limitation that imposes more restriction than necessary to protect legitimate 
state interest fails to fulfil the requirement of proportionality.  
 
1. Limitation under the Constitution 
 
15. See, e.g., ICCPR, Arts. 12(3), 14(1), 18(3), 19(3)(b), 21 & 22(2); FDRE 
CONSTITUTION Arts. 20(1), 26(3), 27(5) & 30. 
16. JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 7, at 186-187; and Handyside v. United Kingdom, 
European Court, (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 
17.  Id, at 187. 
18.  See, e.g., ICCPR, Arts. 12(3), 18(3), 19(3), 21 & 22(2); FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 
27(5). 
19.  Syracusa Principles, supra note 12, para 10(d). 
20.  JAYAWICKRAMAY, supra note 7, 189. 
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Three. Depending on their scope of definition and limitation, fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the Constitution may fall under three categories. The 
first category contains rights that are not restrictively defined. It also does 
not contain specific limitation clause. The rights in this category may be 
regarded as absolute rights. As such, they cannot be limited through any 
law. Examples include right to be protected against cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, and prohibition of slavery.21
However, the absence of limitation clause in a provision of the 
Constitution that defines the content of a particular right or absence of 
phrases that restrictively defines content of that right does not elevate that 
right to the rank of absolute rights.  For example, Article 32 (freedom of 
movement) does not restrictively define the right. It does not contain 
limitation clause either. An interpretation of Article 32 in line with Article 
12 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
suggests that freedom of movement can be restricted because the latter 
provides for restrictions “to protect national security, public order (ordre 
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.” 
Otherwise, some prohibition under the Criminal Code such as prohibition 
from resorting to certain place, prohibition to settle down or reside in a 
place, obligation to reside in specified place or area, or withdrawal of 
official papers such as Identification cards and passports that can be 




The second category of rights is restrictively defined. For example, 
Article 17(2) provides that “[n]o person may be subject to arbitrary arrest.” 
The provision does not prohibit an arrest. Rather, it prohibits an arbitrary 
arrest. If an arrest is arbitrary, it is “incompatible with the principles of 




21.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 18(1) & 18(2).  
22. THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 
Proclamation No. 414/2004, FED. NEGARIT GAZZETE, Year No, 9 May 2005 (hereafter 
CRIMINAL CODE), Arts. 145-149. 
23. JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 7, at 376. 
  Thus, lawful arrest 
(e.g., arresting a person according to an arrest warrant or while committing 
a crime) is not an arbitrary arrest and it does not violate right to liberty. A 
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law that permits arrest and lays down its procedure in detail would not 
contravene Article 17.  
The third category contains specific limitation clause which empowers 
the legislature to promulgate laws limiting rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution. The right to privacy under Article 26 of the Constitution is 
clear example of rights under this category.24 Article 26(3), like similar 
other provisions, requires enactment of a specific law before limiting right 
to privacy. The purpose of such law must be legitimate state interest such 
as “safeguarding of national security or public peace, the prevention of 
crimes or the protection of health, public morality or the rights and 
freedoms of others.”25
The right of assembly, demonstration and petition guaranteed under 
Article 30 also falls under the third category. It permits making of 




2. Limitation on the Right of Assembly, Demonstration and Petition 
 
26
Although the Constitution does not clearly specify an organ concerned 
with the regulation of the right under Article 30, it is an inherent power of 
the legislature to regulate certain matters through promulgation of 
 which should be reasonable, clear and accessible. 
Ethiopian laws may fulfil the requirements of reasonability and clarity, but 
they are not accessible in general. Proclamations and Regulations are 
published in the Federal Negarit Gazeta, which is available only in Addis 
Ababa.  Are they made for people in Addis Ababa only? Accessibility of 
regional laws is the worst. One cannot buy even regional constitutions, let 
alone other ordinary laws. Therefore, it seems that Ethiopian legislatures 
make laws for themselves, not for the citizens. 
 
24. Compare Arts. 15, 27(5), 29(6), 30 and similar provisions of the FDRE CONSTITUTION. 
25. FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 26(3). 
26.   The term “law” has been defined to include proclamations, regulations, directives 
and international agreements. See Art. 2(2) of Consolidation of the House of the Federation 
and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities Proclamation No. 251/2001, FED. 
NEGARIT GAZZETE, 7th Year No 41.; see also Art. 2(5) of Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
Proclamation No. 250/2001, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
OF ETHIOPIA, 7th Year, No. 40, 6 July 2001(here after Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
Proc.). 
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proclamations.27  The legislature may delegate some of its power to the 
executive which may make subsidiary laws. These subsidiary laws could be 
regulations issued by the Council of Ministers.28
Article 30 does not allow all kinds of “regulations” to limit its 
application. It requires the “regulations” to be “appropriate.” Obviously, 
regulations should be issued by organs that have power whether that power 
is inherent or delegated. Regulations made by organs that do not have such 
power are not appropriate. As a legislature, the House of Peoples 
Representatives can regulate constitutional rights through laws. Other state 
organs should have authorisation from the House to make subsidiary laws 
for the regulations of constitutional rights. Laws made to take away the 
right of assembly, demonstration and petition in its totality even for the 
shortest period is not a limitation imposed through regulations.
 It may also be directives 
issued by individual ministries or other organs to implement regulations. 
29
Even when the regulations do not extinguish the right of assembly, 
demonstration and petition, they would not be “appropriate” unless they 
address one of the aims enumerated under Article 30(1). The first aim of 
the regulations is ensuring public convenience by providing for “the 
location of open-air meetings and the route of movement of 
demonstrators.” If, for example, participants assemble on a very busy road, 
it would be inconvenient for the public to make proper use of the road. 
Thus, the regulations may prohibit assembly or demonstration on such 
road. However, the regulations should not impose blanket prohibition on 
access to “public streets and parks.”
 Rather, it 
is a suspension or abrogation of the right. It is a suspension if taking away 
of the right is temporary and abrogation if it is permanent.  
30
 
27.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 55(1). 
28.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 77(13). Enacting regulations is not an exclusive power 
of the Council of Minister. For example, the National Electoral Board is empowered to 
make regulations and directives under Art. 110 of the Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia 
Proclamation No. 532/2007, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA, 13th Year No. 54; similarly, the House 
of Federation is also empowered to make regulations under Art. 58 of Consolidation of the 
House of the Federation and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities Proclamation 
No. 251/2001, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA, 7th Year No. 41. 
29.  See JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 7, at 184-185. “The power to impose restrictions on 
fundamental rights is essentially a power to ‘regulate’ the exercise of these rights, not 
extinguish them.” 
30.  CURRIE & DE WAAL, supra note 6, at 414. 
 When regulations are made to 
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prohibit open-air meetings or demonstration in certain places, they should 
leave alternative places for meeting or demonstration.  
The second aim of the regulations should be “the protection of 
democratic rights.” Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, Article 
31(1) does not refer to protection of rights and freedoms of others in 
general.31
The third aim of the regulations should be the protection of public 
morality which refers to “the ideals or general moral beliefs of a society.”
 The Constitution guarantees democratic rights under Part Two of 
Chapter Three (from Articles 29 to 44). If regulations are made to restrict 
right of assembly, demonstration and petition to protect, for example, 
freedom of expression (which falls under democratic rights), a priori, such 
regulations should also be made to protect right to life (which does not fall 
under democratic rights). Thus, understanding Article 30(1) as permitting 
regulations restricting rights of assembly, demonstration and petition to 
protect rights and freedoms of others is more logical and in line with 
international human rights instruments.  
32 
The concept of “public morality varies over time and from one culture to 
another.”33 Public morality can be invoked when it is essential to maintain 
“respect for fundamental values of the community.”34
The fourth and last aim of the regulations should be the protection of 
public peace.
 As multi-ethnic 
nation, there are no common moral standards in Ethiopia. What may be 
considered as appropriate in the Southern Ethiopia may be considered 
morally shocking in the Northern Ethiopia.  Thus, regulations restricting 
right of assembly, demonstration and petition should take into 
consideration part of the country to which they apply. For example, nude 
demonstration may be prohibited on the ground of protecting public 
morality in part of the country where nudity is immoral.  
35  Regulations made for the purpose of avoiding violence and 
public disturbance may restrict right of assembly, demonstration and 
petition. Such regulations may prohibit “riotous or disorderly assembly.”36
 
31.  Compare, FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 26(3) & 27(5).  See also ICCPR, Art. 21. 
32.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (7th ed. 1999). 
33.  Syracusa Principles, supra note 12, para 27. 
34.  Id. 
35.  ICCPR uses “public order” instead of “public peace.”  
36.  MAHENDRA P. SINGH, V.N. SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 123 (2001). 
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Article 30(2) implies that laws may be enacted to protect well-being 
of the youth, honour and reputation of individuals, and to prohibit 
propaganda for war and public expression of opinions intended to injure 
human dignity. In other words, these laws can limit the right guaranteed 
under Article 30(1). Exercise of the right of assembly, demonstration and 
petition is not a defence for civil and criminal liability that could be 
imposed for violation of those laws. For example, defamation is a crime 
and entails criminal liability, and at the same time it is a tortuous act 
resulting in civil liability.37
Derogation refers to temporary suspension of human rights during a 
state of emergency.
 Thus, a defendant in a defamation case cannot 
invoke Article 30(2) as a defence.  
 
B. Derogation  
 
38 Emergency, as opposed to normalcy, is a situation 
“outside an ordinary course of events.”39  It refers to “a sudden, urgent, 
usually unforeseen event or situation that requires immediate action, often 
without time for prior reflection and consideration.”40 It may include 
“armed conflicts, civil wars, insurrections, severe economic shocks, natural 
disasters, and similar threats.”41 Derogation from fundamental rights and 
freedoms “enables the government to resort to measures of an exceptional 
and temporary nature in order to protect the essential fabric of that 
society.”42
A state of emergency is classified into de jure and de facto. A De jure 
state of emergency exists when states comply with legal requirements for 
 
 
37.  CIVIL CODE OF THE EMPIRE OF ETHIOPIA (1960), Proclamation No 160/1960, FED. 
NEGARIT GAZZETE, 19th Year No 2, Art. 2044; CRIMINAL CODE, Art. 613. 
38.  Awol Kassim Allo, Derogation or Limitation? Rethinking the African Human 
Rights System of Derogation in Light of the European System, 2 ETH. J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 25 
(2009). 
39. Oren Gross, “Once more unto the breach”: The systemic failure of applying the 
European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies 23 YALE J. INT. L. 438,  
at 439 (1998). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, et al., Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations 
from Human Rights Treaties, 65 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 673, at 673 (2011). 
42. JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 6, at 202. 
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its declaration. If states exercise their emergency power without complying 
with preconditions prescribed in their constitutions and international human 
rights instrument, they are in a de facto state of emergency.43  A de jure 
state of emergency becomes de facto when emergency “measures are 
extended beyond the formal termination of a declared state of 
emergency.”44
Declaring a state of emergency is a concurrent power of the federal 
and state governments. State governments can declare state-wide states of 
emergencies on two grounds: an occurrence of natural disaster and a 
breakout of an epidemic.
  
 
1. A State of Emergency under the Constitution 
 
45 Decrees of state executives should be approved 
by a two-third majority vote of state legislatures.46 Like the Federal 
Constitutions state Constitutions require establishment of state of 
emergency inquiry boards.47
The Federal Constitution gives the power of declaring and lifting 
“national state of emergency and states of emergencies limited to certain 
 
 
43. Yehenew Tsegaye Walilegne, State of Emergency and Human Rights under 1995 
Ethiopian Constitution, 21 J. ETH. L. 78, at 87 (2007). 
44.  Id. 
45. FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 93(1)(b); See REVISED CONSTITUTION OF AFAR STATE 
(2001), Art. 106; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF THE AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, 
Proclamation No. 59/2001, ZIKRE HIG OF THE COUNCIL OF THE AMHARA NATIONAL 
REGIONAL STATE, 7th year No. 2, 5 November 2001, Bahir Dar, Art.  114; REVISED 
CONSTITUTION, 2001, OF THE SOUTHERN NATIONS, NATIONALITIES AND PEOPLES REGIONAL 
STATE CONSTITUTION, Proclamation No. 35/2001, Art. 121; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF 
BENSHANGUL-GUMUZ STATE, 2002, Art. 115; The Revised Constitution of Gambela 
Peoples’ Regional State, Proclamation No. 27/2002, Art. 117; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION 
OF OROMIA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, Proclamation No. 46/2001, Art. 108; THE REVISED 
CONSTITUTION OF SOMALI NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, 2002, Art. 105; THE REVISED 
CONSTITUTION OF HARARI NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, 2004, Art. 76. 
46.  Id. 
47. See REVISED CONSTITUTION OF AFAR STATE, Art. 107; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION 
OF THE AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, Art. 115; REVISED CONSTITUTION OF THE 
SOUTHERN NATIONS, NATIONALITIES AND PEOPLES REGIONAL STATE, Art. 122; THE REVISED 
CONSTITUTION OF BENSHANGUL-GUMUZ STATE, Art. 116; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF 
GAMBELA PEOPLES’ REGIONAL STATE, Art. 118; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF OROMIA 
NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, Art. 109; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF SOMALI NATIONAL 
REGIONAL STATE, Art. 106; THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF HARARI NATIONAL REGIONAL 
STATE, 2004, Art. 76(5). 
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parts of the country” to the Federal Government.48 Both the legislature and 
the executive can declare a state of emergency.49 A state of emergency 
declared by the Federal Executive (Council of Ministers) must be approved 
by a two-third majority vote of the House of Peoples’ Representatives, 
otherwise it lapses.50 To obtain the approval of the House, the Council of 
Ministers must present its decree within 48 hours if the House is in session 
or within 15 days if the House is in recess.51 The decree remains in force 
for six months unless it is extended for an additional four months by two-
third majority vote of the House.52
The grounds for declaring a state of emergency is limited to four: “an 
external invasion, a breakdown of law and order which endangers the 
constitutional order and which cannot be controlled by the regular law 
enforcement agencies and personnel, a natural disaster, or an epidemic.”
  
53 
The state of emergency may be declared as soon as external invasion 
occurs. Since the adoption of the Constitution, Ethiopia faced one external 
invasion, the Eritrea invasion of June 1998.54
 
48.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 51(16). 
49.  Id., Arts. 55(8) & 77(10). 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id., Art. 93(2). 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id., Art. 93(1)(a). State executives have also similar power. 
54.  See KINFE ABRAHAM, ETHIO-ERITREAN HISTORY AND ETHIO-ERITREAN WAR, at xi 
(Ethiopian Inaternational Institute for Peace and Development) (2004). 
 The invasion did not resulted 
in declaration of a state of emergency.   
Another ground for declaring a state of emergency is a breakdown of 
law and order which may include violence and public disturbance due to 
riots or rebellions. If public peace, safety and tranquillity of the society are 
in danger, the Council of Ministers can declare a state of emergency. Not 
all kinds of breakdown of law and order are a ground for a state of 
emergency though.  If it does not endanger the constitutional order or if it 
can be handled by regular law enforcement without involving the defence 
force, it is not necessary to declare a state of emergency. Since the 
Constitution requires the occurrence of a breakdown of law and order 
before declaring a state of emergency, it is not proper to declare a state of 
emergency for an eminent danger to law and order.  
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Natural disaster and epidemic are other grounds of declaring a state of 
emergency. Natural disaster may include earth quick, flood, tsunami and 
other similar occurrence. Although flood in Dire Dawa caused significant 
loss of life and property and displacement of people in 2006, it was not 
invoked as grounds for declaring a state of emergency. Epidemic refers to 
the appearance of a particular disease, such as cholera and flu, in a large 
number of people at the same time. Epidemic has not been invoked to 
declare a state of emergency since the adoption of the Constitution.  
The House of Peoples’ Representatives must establish a State of 
Emergency Inquiry Board when it declares a state of emergency or when it 
approves a state of emergency declared by the Council of Ministers.55 The 
Board consists of seven members from the House and legal experts. The 
Board has three functions. First, it makes public the names of individuals 
arrested and the reason for their arrest within one month. Since it is an 
emergency situation, arrested persons cannot claim their right to be brought 
before a court within 48 hours.56 In normal situations, every person has a 
right to know reasons for his or her arrest at the time the arrest takes 
place.57
Second, the Board monitors respect for Article 18(1) of the 
Constitution, prohibition of inhumane treatment. Although there are other 
provisions of the Constitution that cannot be suspended during a state of 
emergency, Article 18 is more likely to be abused. Thus, the Constitution 
creates the Board as an organ to protect every person against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment during emergencies.
  
58  If the Board finds 
incidences of inhumane treatments, it recommends to the Prime Minister or 
to the Council of Ministers that inhumane treatments must cease.59 It also 
ensures that persons who commit such act are prosecuted.60 Finally, the 
Board submits its recommendation to the House whether a state of 
emergency should be continued or lifted.61
 
55.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 93(5). 
56.  Id., Art. 19(4). 
57.  Id., Art. 19(1). 
58.  Id., Art. 93(5)(a). 
59.  Id., Art. 93(5)(b). 
60.  Id., Art. 93(5)(c). 
61.  Id., Art. 93(5)(d). 
  
 6/21/2013 
16 Haramaya Law Review [Vol. 1:2 
2. Suspension of Rights During a State of Emergency: Is it allowed? 
 
According to Article 93(4), once a state of emergency is declared, the 
council of ministers can suspend “political and democratic rights” 
guaranteed in the Constitution except the prohibition of torture (Article 
18(1)), the prohibition of slavery (Article 18(2)), the right to equality 
(Article 25), and the right to self determination (Article 39(1) and 39(2)) 
which are non-derogable rights.62 Reading Article 93(4) alone suggests that 
the Council of Ministers can suspend most of the rights under chapter three 
of the Constitution. However, interpreting chapter three in light of Article 
13(2) and Article 9(4) of the Constitution suggests otherwise.63
 According to Article 13(2), interpretation of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the Constitution should conform to international human rights 
law and other instruments adopted by Ethiopia.
 
64 Since the Constitution 
uses the terms instruments adopted instead of treaties or agreements 
ratified, reference should be made to declarations, resolutions etc, adopted 
within the framework of the United Nations, the African Union or others 
international organization to which Ethiopia is a member.65 The 
Constitution also refers to Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is 
not a treaty.66
Meaning, scope and categories of rights under chapter three of the 
Constitution must not contradict with International Human Rights Law 
including ‘soft’ law. Derogation clause in the Constitution affects scope of 
rights during a state of emergency. It also creates two categories of rights: 
derogable rights and non-derogable rights. Can the Council of Ministers 
suspend all provisions of chapter three that are not listed under Article 
  
 
62. See generally, Adem Kassie Abebe, Human Rights under the Ethiopian 
Constitution: A Descriptive Overview, 5 MIZAN L. REV. 2, 41-71 (2011). 
63. FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 13(2) provides that “[t]he fundamental rights and freedoms 
specified in this Chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and 
international instruments adopted by Ethiopia.” Art. 9(4) provides that “[a]ll international 
agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land.” 
64. The Amharic version of Art. 13(2) the FDRE CONSTITUTION refers to alem akef 
yesebawi mebtoch hegegat (which means International Human Rights Law). 
65. Compare, FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 13(2) with Art. 9(4). 
66.  The binding Amharic version does not refer to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  
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93(4)(c)? For example, can it suspend the right to life (Article 15) or 
freedom of religion (Article 27)? The answer is negative if one reads 
chapter three in line with Article 13(2) and Article 9(4). Consideration of 
some international human rights treaties to which Ethiopia is a party makes 
the point more clear.  
Under Article 4 of the ICCPR, states including Ethiopia cannot 
derogate from prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, right to life, 
prohibition of retrospective criminal law, right to be recognised as a person, 
and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.67 The Human Rights 
Committee, an organ that monitors implementation of the ICCPR, further 
expanded the category of non-derogable rights by identifying provisions of 
the ICCPR containing elements that cannot be subject to lawful 
derogation.68  According to the Committee, the rights of prisoners to be 
treated with humanity and freedom of opinion contain elements that cannot 
be subject to lawful derogation.69
The Human Rights Committee requires states to change their 
constitutions when the latter allow derogation from rights that are listed 
under Article 4 of the ICCPR as non-derogable. For example, the 
Constitution of Tanzania expressly allows derogation from the right to 
life.
 
70 In its concluding observation on Tanzania’s report, the Human 
Rights Committee observed that “[c]oncern is expressed over the 
constitutional provisions allowing derogations from the right to life, which 
are not compatible with Article 4 of the Covenant. In this regard, changes 
are clearly necessary.”71
 
67.  ICCPR, Ethiopia became party to ICCPR on 11 June 1993. See United Nations 
Treaty Collections at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ 
no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed on 13 November 2012). 
68.  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para 13; Human Rights Committee, General 
comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), 
para 5. 
69.  Id. 
70.  CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (as amended), passed on 25 
April 1977, Art. 31(1). 
71.  Concluding Observation ICCPR, United Republic of Tanzania, A/48/40 vol. I 
(1993) 35 at para 171. 
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Ethiopia submitted its first report on the implementation of the ICCPR 
to the Human Rights Committee in 2009.72 The report states that a state of 
emergency had never been declared since entry into force of the 
Constitution.73 It also refers to “the right to equality, the right to self-
determination, the right to develop and speak one’s own language, the right 
to promote culture and preserve history, as well as the right to be protected 
from inhumane treatment” as non-derogable rights.74
 
72.  Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties 
under Article 40 of the Covenant, First periodic report of States parties: Ethiopia, 
CCPR/C/ETH/1, 22 October 2009. 
73.  Id., para 32. 
74.  Id., para 31. 
 Despite the absence 
of right to life and other rights that are non-derogable under the ICCPR 
from the Ethiopian list of non-derogable rights, the Committee did not raise 
any concern. Given the Committee’s concern on derogable right to life in 
Tanzanian Constitution, one may surmise that the Committee would only 
be worried when constitutions expressly permit derogation from rights that 
are non-derogable under the ICCPR or when states actually suspend such 
rights. 
Rights that are non-derogable under the ICCPR have corresponding 
provisions in the Constitution. They are Article 15 (right to life), Article 21 
(rights of persons held in custody and convicted prisoners), Article 22 
(non-retroactivity of criminal law), Article 24(3) (right to be recognised as 
a person), Article 27 (freedom of religion, belief and opinion), and Article 
29 (right of thought opinion and expression). Since the ICCPR as 
interpreted by the Human Rights Committee defines these rights as non-
derogable rights, an understanding of the Constitution in light of Article 
13(2) puts them in the same category. That is to say, the Council of 
Ministers cannot suspend Articles 15, 21, 22, 24(3), 27 and 29 of the 
Constitution during a state of emergency. Of course, there is nothing in the 
Constitution that expressly authorise the Council of Minister to suspend 
these provisions. The Council of Minister may make reference to the 
ICCPR which is a domestic law according to Article 9(4). Here, it will find 
a proscription that rights guaranteed under these provisions cannot be 
suspended during a state of emergency.  
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Interestingly, constitutions of regional states provides for additional 
non-derogable rights. The executives of regional states cannot suspend 
right to life, right to security of person, right to be recognised as a person, 
right of prisoners to be treated with dignity, and freedom of religion during 
a state of emergency declared by regional states.75
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), albeit adopted at the same time with the ICCPR, does not 
contain a derogation clause.
 Almost all constitutions 
of regional states provides for wider list of non-derogable rights than the 
Federal Constitution. Thus, regional constitutions are additional domestic 
law showing that the list of non-derogable rights in Ethiopia is more rights 
than those listed under Article 93(4)(c) of the Constitution.  
76
The Constitution provides for economic social and cultural rights 
framed in terms of state duties instead of individual entitlements. These 
rights are guaranteed under Article 34 (marital, personal and family rights), 
Article 41 (economic, social and cultural rights) and Article 42 (labour 
rights).  Compared to its predecessors, the 1987 Constitution, the (1995) 
Constitution is a normative regression. Framed in individual entitlement, 
the 1987 Constitution provides for right to work, right to free education, 
and right to health care of all Ethiopians.
 That may raise an assumption that it is not 
necessary to suspend economic, social and cultural rights during a state of 
emergency. The implication is that states including Ethiopia cannot 




75. See REVISED CONSTITUTION OF AFAR STATE (2001), Art. 106(4); THE REVISED 
CONSTITUTION OF THE AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, Proclamation No. 59/2001, 
ZIKRE HIG OF THE COUNCIL OF THE AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, 7th year No. 2, 5 
November 2001, Bahir Dar, Art.  114(4); REVISED CONSTITUTION, 2001, OF THE SOUTHERN 
NATIONS, NATIONALITIES AND PEOPLES REGIONAL STATE CONSTITUTION, Proclamation No. 
35/2001, Art. 121(4); THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF BENSHANGUL-GUMUZ STATE, 2002, 
Art. 115(4); THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF GAMBELA PEOPLES’ REGIONAL STATE, 
Proclamation No. 27/2002, Art. 117(4); THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF OROMIA NATIONAL 
REGIONAL STATE, Proclamation No. 46/2001, Art. 108(4), THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF 
SOMALI NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, 2002, Art. 105(4); THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF 
HARARI NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE, 2004, Art. 76(4). 
76. ICESCR, Ethiopia ratified it on 11 June 1993. See United Nations Treaty 
Collections at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en accessed on 13 November 2012. 
77.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Arts. 38, 40 & 42. 
 The (1995) Constitution only 
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acknowledges obligation of the state “to allocate ever increasing resources 
to provide [...] health, education and other social services” to the people.78
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)
 
Be that as it may, an understanding of the Constitution in light of the 
ICESCR denotes that the Council of Ministers cannot suspend Articles 34, 
41 and 42 of the Constitution during a state of emergency. 
79 like ICESCR does not contain a derogation 
clause. The Committee that supervise the implementation of CEDAW 
clearly held that ‘obligations of States parties do not cease in periods of 
armed conflict or in states of emergency resulting from political events or 
natural disasters.’80
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
 Similarly, the rights of women under Article 35 of the 
Constitution cannot be suspended during a state of emergency. 
81 has no derogation 
clause, too. That means, the rights of children are non-derogable. An 
understanding of Article 36 (rights of children) of the Constitution in light 
of the CRC would mean that these rights cannot be suspended even during 
a state of emergency. Although the case does not involve derogation issue, 
the Federal Supreme Court has invoked the CRC as part of the domestic 
law in Tsedale Demissie v Kifle Demissie. 82
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) 




78.  Id., Art. 41(4). 
79. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
opened for signature in New York on 18 December 1979 and entered into force on 3 
September 1981. Ethiopia signed and ratified CEDAW on 10 July 1980 and 10 September 
1981 respectively. See United Nations Treaty Collections at http://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en accessed on 
13 November 2012. 
80. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General 
recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under Art. 2 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, para 11. 
81.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in New York on 20 November 1989 
and entered into force on 2 September 1990. Ethiopia ratified the CRC on 14 May 1991. See 
United Nations Treaty Collections at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src 
=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed on 13 November 2012). 
82.  Tsedale Demissie v Kifle Demissie, File  No. 23632, decided on 26 Tekemt 2000 
E.C, Fed. Sup. Ct., Cass. Div. Jud., Vol. 5, at 189.   
83.  African Charter, Ethiopia acceded to the African Charter on 15 June 1998. See 
OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols and Charters at http://www.au.int/en/treaties 
(accessed on 13 November 2012). 
 The African 
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Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), a 
quasi-judicial organ, monitors the implementation of the African Charter.84 
The Charter is silent on a state of emergency and subsequent suspension of 
human and peoples’ rights. In dealing with individual communications, the 
African Commission exercised its mandate of interpreting the African 
Charter and held consistently that derogations from Charter rights are 
prohibited.85
In Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. 
Chad, the African Commission considered a communication in which the 
defendant state invoked civil war in its territory as a defence.
  
86  In Article 
19 v. Eritrea, the African Commission dealt with the Eritrea’s argument 
that it can suspend Charter rights during war where its existence is 
threatened.87 The holding of the Commission is the same in both 
communications. States cannot invoke “existence of war, international or 
civil, or other emergency situation” within their territory to defend 
violation of any right guaranteed in the Charter.88 The African Commission 
confirmed similar position in other communications.89 Therefore, the 
African Commission “elevated all Charter rights to the level of regional jus 
cogens.”90
In Jawara v The Gambia, the African Commission dealt with a 
communication alleging violation of the African Charter as a result of 





84.  AFRICAN CHARTER, Art. 45. 
85.  Id., Art. 45(3). 
86. Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad (2000) 
AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995), para 19. 
87. Article 19 v Eritrea, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Communication No. 275/2003, AHRLR 73 (ACHPR 2007), para 87. 
88.  Id., para 98-99. 
89.  Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 
2000), para 84; Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 
1998), para 67; Constitutional Rights Project and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 227 
(ACHPR 1999), para 41; Amnesty International and Others v Sudan (2000) AHRLR 297 
(ACHPR 1999), 42; Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Another v Sudan (2009) 
AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009), para 165 & 167; Communication 250/2002, Liesbeth Zegveld 
and Mussie Ephrem v Eritrea, Seventeenth Activity Report 2003–2004, Annex VII, para 60. 
90.  FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA, at 252 (2007). 
91.  Jawara v The Gambia (2000), AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000), para 48-50. 
 The Commission examined the implication of suspending 
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constitutional rights under the African Charter and concluded that 
suspending bill of rights in the Constitution amounts to violation of Articles 
1 and 2 of the African Charter.92
First, the Council followed an incorrect step to reach its conclusion. 
The Council should have ascertained the meaning, nature and scope of the 
right that was alleged to have been infringed. It should have defined the 
content of freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition before it 
proceeded to its limitation. To do so, the Council should have referred to 
international human rights law as required by Article 13(2) of the 
Constitution and Article 20(2) of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
Proclamation.
  
Therefore, an organ interpreting chapter three of the Constitution 
according to the African Charter reaches two conclusions. First, all rights 
guaranteed under chapter three of the Constitution cannot be suspended 
during a state of emergency. Besides, the African Charter forms part of the 
domestic law. Second, suspension of the rights under chapter three implies 
that Ethiopia violates its international obligation under the African Charter.  
 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE COUNCIL’S DECISION 
 
As an organ with the power to recommend interpretation of the 
Constitution to House of Federation, it is reasonable to expect the Council 
of Constitutional Inquiry (the Council) to provide exposition of 
constitutional provisions. In CUD v Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Asres, 
the Council did not make a detailed analysis of constitutional provisions 
invoked in the case. Rather, it erred in a number of instances.  
93
Second, the Council confused limitation on fundamental rights and 
freedoms with their suspension during a state of emergency. It wrongly 
assumed a complete suspension of constitutional rights as their limitation. 
Limitation on fundamental rights as discussed above does not justify 
 Given that limitation is an infringement of the right, it 
would be erroneous to reach a conclusion before ascertaining the content of 
the right in question. 
 
92.  Id. 
93.  Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proc. 
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suspension of fundamental rights and freedoms no matter how short the 
period is. However, the Prime Minister’s ban on right of assembly, 
demonstration and petition completely suspended the right. Besides, 
limitations are usually a permanent restriction while the Prime Minister’s 
ban was temporary since it was imposed only for one month. Such ban 
would have been denoted more appropriately as suspension of (derogation 
from) fundamental rights and freedoms.94
Unfortunately, the Court and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry did 
not call the defendant for defence. Since the Prime Minister issued the 
decree as head of the government, the Ministry of Justice as the legal 
representative of the government or legal advisor of the Prime Minister 
could have been called to defend the suit. It was not necessary to call the 
Prime Minister to appear before the court in person. Had the Court or the 
Council called the defendant, it would have been highly probable that the 
defendant would have raised the suspension power under Article 93. The 
Court did not seem to have the courage to call the defendant. As Getachew 
observed the Court was in a hurry to send the case for interpretation and get 
out of the political flame.
  
The conclusion that the Prime Minister made suspension of rights 
during a state of emergency presupposes other premises. The decree of the 
Prime Minister must comply with procedural and substantive requirements 
laid down in the Constitution. To begin with procedural requirements, a 
state of emergency must be declared by the Council of Minister and 
approved by the House of Peoples’ Representatives. Then the question is: 
does the Prime Minister’s decree amount to declaration of a state of 
emergency? Of course, it is the power of the Council of Ministers to 
declare a state of emergency subject to approval by the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives. The Council of Ministers speaks through its chairperson, 
the Prime Minister. When it makes regulations, for example, it is the Prime 
Minister that signs them, not every member of the Council.  Thus, the 
decree of the Prime Minister is presumed to be the declaration of the 
Council of Ministers in the absence of contrary proof.  
95
 
94. See Assefa Fiseha, Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia: Exploring the 
Experience of the House of Federation (HOF), 1 MIZAN L. REV. 1, at 17 (2007). 
95.  Getachew Assefa, supra note 2. 
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The House of Peoples’ Representatives was in session when the 
decree was issued on Ginbot 7 because the House recesses “in the month of 
Yekatit as well as from Hamle (1) up to the last Sunday of Meskerem each 
year.”96
Even if the decree was presented to the House for approval, it would 
not have passed the substantive constitutional requirements that a state of 
emergency is declared only on four grounds (assuming that the House is 
not a rubber stamp).
 The decree must have been presented to the House within 48 hours 
for approval. As the plaintiff did not challenge the constitutionality of the 
decree on this point, it is not clear from the record whether the decree was 
sent to the House for approval. Assuming that the case was not sent to the 
House for approval, would that make a state of emergency non-existent? 
Legally speaking, the answer is positive. No state of emergency exists for 
more than two days without the approval of the House when it is in session. 
But lack of legal life does not erase the facts on the ground. Thus, the 
situation can be described as a de facto state of emergency.  
97
Although not clear from the Constitution, a formal requirement of an 
emergency decree may call for a passing comment. Can declaration of a 
state of emergency be made orally? The Constitution does not require the 
Council of Minister to make its decree in writing and publish it in the 
Federal Negarit Gazeta. In the absence of such formal requirements the 
Council of Ministers has the discretion to choose the means of 
 The decree was based on the ground that there was a 
looming threat to law and order. Its purpose was to make the process of 
counting and announcing results of election peaceful and avoid post 
election disorder. Does this amount to “a breakdown of law and order 
which endangers the constitutional order and which cannot be controlled by 
the regular law enforcement agencies and personnel” within the meaning of 
Article 93(1)(a)? The textual reading of the Constitution clearly requires an 
ex post declaration of a state of emergency. But the decree was an ex ante 
declaration as a breakdown of law and order did not occur at the time of the 
declaration. Rather, there was a threat of breakdown of law and order and 
the decree was made to avoid a future danger.  
 
96.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 58(2); the House of Peoples’ Representatives of The 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rules of Procedures and Members’ Code of 
Conduct Regulation No. 3/1998, Art. 24(1). 
97.  FDRE CONSTITUTION, Art. 93(1)(a). 
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communicating its decree to the general public. In this case, the Council of 
Ministers through its chairperson chose an oral decree that was published in 
Addis Zemen, a news paper that has wider circulation than the Federal 
Negarit Gazeta.  
Third, it is conspicuously clear from the Council’s holding that it did 
not consider the matter meticulously. If the Council based its decision on 
specific limitation clause under Article 30(1), it should have decided two 
important issues:  
a) Whether the Prime Minister’s decree falls within the 
meaning of “appropriate regulation.”   
b) Whether the decree was made for the aim enumerated 
under Article 30(1).  
Regulation of the right of assembly, demonstration and petition as 
discussed above should be provided by law which may include 
proclamations, regulations or directives. However, the Prime Minister’s 
decree was a notice to the general public in the form of a press release than 
rules made to regulate constitutional rights because it was a declaration 
orally made through mass media and reported by print media, Addis Zemen. 
Thus, it would have been difficult for the Council to find the Prime 
Minister’s decree as an “appropriate regulation” within the meaning of 
Article 30(1). 
Regulations restricting rights guaranteed under Article 30(1), albeit 
appropriate, should address aims enumerated thereunder as discussed 
above. In other words, the Council should have considered whether the 
Prime Minister’s decree was made to ensure public convenience, to protect 
democratic rights, public morality or peace. It could have made an 
argument that the decree was issued to protect public peace. But the effect 
of the decree and its appropriateness militates against this argument.  
Fourth, the Council erred in justifying what it called ‘limitation’ on 
right of assembly, demonstration and petition. The Council did not find the 
decree in violation of the Constitution since the Prime Minister is the 
supreme executive organ vested with wide power. Here, the Council seems 
to confuse “wide power” with “absolute power.” The Prime Minister does 
not have absolute power. One of the purposes of entrenching fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the Constitution is to limit power of the government 
including power of the Prime Minister. Having wide power does not entitle 
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a state official to encroach on fundamental rights and freedoms unless such 
official wants to be above the supreme law of the land. 
Finally, the Council’s decision that there was no need of constitutional 
interpretation is erroneous. If the Council interpreted fundamental rights 
and freedoms in conformity with the international human rights law, it 
would have found the constitutional provision authorising the Council of 
Minister to suspend “political and democratic rights” inconsistent with 
international human rights law.98 In resolving the inconsistency, the 
Council could have adopted one of the arguments on the hierarchy of 
international human rights treaties in domestic laws.99
Moreover, the decision of the Council was very brief and lacked 
explanation of constitutional provisions and other relevant principles. The 
decision of the Council was not based on appropriate research. It should 
have done some research and at least see how similar issues were resolved 
 Obviously, 
prohibition of suspension advances respect for human rights and the 
Constitution should conform to international human rights law.  Therefore, 
the Council should have recommended to the House of Federation that 





In the CUD Case, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry considered 
constitutionality of a decree suspending right of assembly, demonstration 
and petition for one month. The Council mistakenly assumed as a 
limitation on right of assembly, demonstration and petition what should 
have been regarded as derogation therefrom. It did not properly analyse the 
provision of Article 30 to test the decree against the essential elements of 
the limitation clause provided in that provisions. Instead, it gave a wrong 
justification for consistency of the decree with the Constitution.  
 
98.  Id., Art. 93(4)(b). 
99.  For the arguments on the hierarchy of international human rights treaties. See 
Takele Soboka Bulto, The Monist-Dualist Divide and the Supremacy Clause: Revisiting the 
Status of Human rights Treaties under the Ethiopian Constitution 132, 23 (1) J. ETH. L. 
(2009); Ibrahim Idris, The Place of International Human Rights Convention in the 1994 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE)Constitution 113, 20 J. ETH. L. 2000. 
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in other jurisdictions. Given the requirement of Article 13(2), the Council 
should have resorted to international human rights instruments for 
reference. The jurisprudence of organs monitoring these instruments such 
as decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights would have been of 
great help in understanding a nature of limitation and their difference from 
suspension. The Council missed the opportunity to lay down tests of 
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